"The President. . . knew he would have to act."

A
jL JLfter the meeting in the Cabinet Room, I
walked back to the Mansion with the President. It
would be difficult; the stakes were high—of the highest
and most substantial kind—but he knew he would have
to act. The U.S. could not accept what the Russians had
done. What that action would be was still to be determined. But he was convinced from the beginning that
he would have to do something. To keep the discussions
from being inhibited and because he did not want to
arouse attention, he decided not to attend all the meetings of our committee. This was wise. Personalities
change when the President is present, and frequently
even strong men make recommendations on the basis of
what they believe the President wishes to hear. He instructed our group to come forward with recommendations for one course or possibly several alternative
courses of action.
It was during the afternoon and evening of that
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first day, Tuesday, that we began to discuss the idea of a
quarantine or blockade. Secretary McNamara, by
Wednesday, became the blockade's strongest advocate.
He argued that it was limited pressure, which could be
increased as the circumstances warranted. Further, it
was dramatic and forceful pressure, which would be understood yet, most importantly, still leave us in control
of events. Later he reinforced his position by reporting
that a surprise air strike against the missile bases alone
—a surgical air strike, as it came to be called—was militarily impractical in the view ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff,
that any such military action would have to include all
military installations in Cuba, eventually leading to an
invasion. Perhaps we would come to that, he argued.
Perhaps that course of action would turn out to be inevitable. "But let's not start with that course," ifby chance
that kind of confrontation with Cuba, and of necessity
with the Soviet Union, could be avoided.
Those who argued for the military strike instead
of a blockade pointed out that a blockade would not in
fact remove the missiles and would not even stop the
work from going ahead on the missile sites themselves.
The missiles were already in Cuba, and all we would be
doing with a blockade would be "closing the door after
the horse had left the barn." Further, they argued, we
34
"The President . . . knew he would have to act."
would be bringing about a confrontation with the Soviet
Union by stopping their ships, when we should be concentrating on Cuba and Castro.
Their most forceful argument was that our installation of a blockade around Cuba invited the Russians
to do the same to Berlin. Ifwe demanded the removal of
missiles from Cuba as the price for lifting our blockade,
they would demand the removal ofmissiles surrounding
the Soviet Union as the reciprocal act.
And so we argued, and so we disagreed—all dedicated, intelligent men, disagreeing and fighting about
the future oftheir country, and ofmankind. Meanwhile,
time was slowly running out.
An examination of photography taken on
Wednesday, the 17th of October, showed several other
installations, with at least sixteen and possibly thirtytwo missiles ofover a thousand-mile range. Our military
experts advised that these missiles could be in operation
within a week. The next day, Thursday, estimates by our
Intelligence Community placed.in Cuba missiles with
an atomic-warhead potential of about one half the current ICBM capacity of the entire Soviet Union. The
photography having indicated that the missiles were
being directed at certain American cities, the estimate
was that within a few minutes of their being fired eighty
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million Americans would be dead.
The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
unanimous in calling for immediate military action.
They forcefully presented their view that the blockade
would not be effective. General Curtis LeMay, Air
Force ChiefofStaff, argued strongly with the President
that a military attack was essential. When the President
questioned what the response of the Russians might be.
General LeMay assured him therewould be no reaction.
President Kennedy was skeptical "They, no more than
we, can let these things go by without doing something.
They can't, after all their statements, permit us to take
out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do
nothing. Ifthey don't take action in Cuba, they certainly
will in Berlin."
The President went on to say that he recognized
the validity of the arguments made by the Joint Chiefs,
the danger that more and more missiles would be placed
in Cuba, and the likelihood, if we did nothing, that the
Russians would move on Berlin and in other areas ofthe
world, feeling the U.S. was completely impotent. Then it
would be too late to do anything in Cuba, for by that
time all their missiles would be operational.
General David M. Shoup, Commandant of the
Marine Corps, summed up everyone's feelings: "You are
36
"The President . . . knew he would have to act
in a pretty bad fix, Mr. President/,
The President answered quickly, "You are in it with me." Everyone
laughed, and, with no final decision, the meeting adjourned.
Later, Secretary McNamara, although he told
the President he disagreed with the Joint Chiefs and favored a blockade rather than an attack, informed him
that the necessary planes, men, and ammunition were
being deployed and that we could be ready to move
with the necessary air bombardments on Tuesday, October 23, if that was to be the decision. The plans called
for an initial attack, consisting of five hundred sorties,
striking all military targets, including the missile sites,
airfields, ports, and gun emplacements.
I supported McNamara's position in favor of a
blockade. This was not from a deep conviction that it
would be a successful course of action, but a feeling that
it had more flexibility and fewer liabilities than a military attack. Most importantly, like others, I could not
accept the idea that the United States would rain bombs
on Cuba, killing thousands and thousands of civilians in
a surprise attack. Maybe the alternatives were not very
palatable, but I simply did not see how we could accept
that course of action for our country.
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson began
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attending our meetings, and he was strongly in favor of
an air attack. I was a great admirer ofhis. In 1961, President Kennedy asked him to prepare a report for the National Security Council recommending a course of action to deal with the Russian threat to Berlin. Listening
to his presentation then, I had thought to myself that I
had never heard anyone so lucid and convincing and
would never wish to be on the otherside ofan argument
with him. Now he made his arguments that an air attack
and invasion represented our only"alternative in the
same clear and brilliant way. He said that the President
of the United States had the responsibility for the security ofthe people of the United States and ofthe whole
free world, that it was his obligation to take the only action which could protect that security, and that that
meant destroying the missiles.
With some trepidation, I argued that, whatever
validity the military and political arguments were for an
attack in preference to a blockade, America's traditions
and history would not permit such a course of action.
Whatever military reasons he and others could marshal,
they were nevertheless, in the last analysis, advocating a
surprise attack by a very large nation against a very
small one. This, I said, could not be undertaken by the
U.S. if we were to maintain our moral position at home
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"The President . . . knew he would have to act."
and around the globe. Our struggle against Communism
throughout the world was far more than physical survival—it had as its essence our heritage and our ideals,
and these we must not destroy.
We spent more time on this moral question during the first five days than on any other single matter. At
various times, it was proposed that we send a letter to
Khrushchev twenty-four hours before the bombardment
was to begin, that we send a letter to Castro, thatleaflets
and pamphlets listing the targets be dropped over Cuba
before the attack—all these ideas and more were abandoned for military or other reasons. We struggled and
fought with one another and with our consciences, for it
was a question that deeply troubled us all.
In the midst of all these discussions, Andrei
Gromyko came to see the President. It was an appointment made long before the missiles were uncovered, and
the President felt it would be awkward to cancel it. He
debated whether he should confront the Soviet Foreign
Minister with our knowledge of the missiles' presence
and finally decided that, as he had not yet determined a
final course of action and the disclosure of our knowledge might give the Russians the initiative, he would
simply listen to Gromyko.
They met late Wednesday afternoon in the Presi39
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dent's office in the White House. Gromyko began the
conversation by saying the United States should stop
threatening Cuba. All Cuba wanted was peaceful coexistence, he said; she was not interested in exporting her
system to other Latin American countries. Cuba, like
the Soviet Union, wanted only peace. Premier Khrushchev had instructed him, Gromyko said, to tell President Kennedy that the only assistance being furnished
Cuba was for agriculture and land development, so the
people could feed themselves, plus a small amount ofdefensive arms. In view of all the publicity in the American
press, he said, he wanted to emphasize that the Soviet
Union would never become involved in the furnishing
of offensive weapons to Cuba.
Gromyko said he wished to appeal to the U.S.
and to President Kennedy on behalf of Premier Khrushchev and the Soviet Union to lessen the tensions that
existed with regard to Cuba.
President Kennedy listened, astonished, but also
with some admiration for the boldness of Gromyko's position. Firmly, but with great restraint considering the
provocation, he told Gromyko that it was not the United
States which was fomenting discord, but the Soviet
Union. The U.S.S.R.'s supplying of arms to Cuba was
having a profound effect on the people of the United
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"The President . . . knew he would have to act."
States and was a source ofgreat concern to him. Because
of the personal assurances he had received from Khrushchev, he had been taking the public position that no
action was required against Cuba, and yet the situation
was becoming steadily more dangerous.
Gromyko repeated that the sole objective of the
U.S.S.R. was to "give bread to Cuba in order to prevent
hunger in that country." As far as arms were concerned,
the Soviet Union had simply sent some specialists to
train Cubans to handle certain kinds of armament,
which were only "defensive." He then said he wished to
emphasize the word "defensive" and that none of these
weapons could ever constitute a threat to the United
States.
The President replied that there should be no
misunderstanding of the position of the United States—
that that position had been made clear to the Soviet
Union in meetings between the Attorney General and
Ambassador Dobrynin and in his own public statements. To avoid any misunderstanding, he read aloud
his statement ofSeptember 4, which pointed out the serious consequences that would.arise ifthe Soviet Union
placed missiles or offensive weapons within Cuba.
Gromyko assured him this would never be done,
that the United States should not be concerned. After
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touching briefly on some other matters, he said good-by.
I came by shortly after Gromyko left the White
House. The President ofthe United States, it can be said,
was displeased with the spokesman of the Soviet
Union. . . .